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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this order of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah ("the Commission") pursuant to section 35-1-86, section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue #1. Did the Commission require Ivan D. Thompson ("the Applicant") to prove 
medical causation by a standard of proof other than the preponderance of the evidence? 
Whether the correct standard of proof was applied is a question of law. Questions of law 
are reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, with no deference given to the Commission. 
Willardson v. Indus. Comm'n.. 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993). 
Issue #2. Was the Commission correct in determining that there was no medical causation 
established between the Applicant's seizures and the presence of chemicals in the workplace? 
Medical causation is a question of fact, therefore the correct standard of review is whether 
the Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court. Virgin v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm'n.. 803 P.2d 1284, 
1287 (Utah App. 1990). King v. Indus. Comm'n.. 850P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993). 
Issue #3. Was the Commission correct to deny medical expense benefits to the Applicant 
even though the medical panel determined that the medical expenses were reasonable and 
justified? 
The legislature granted the Commission statutory discretion to adopt the findings and the 
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decisions of the medical panel. Utah Code Ann. Section 35-l-77(2)(d) (1994). Where there is 
such discretion, the standard of review is under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. 
King v. Indus. Comm'n.. 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993). In addition, under Section 35-
1-45 of the Utah Code Annotated, employers and their insurance carriers are liable for medical 
expenses only if there is a compensable injury. 
DETERMATIVE STATUTES 
Statutes believed to be determinative include Section 35-1-45 and Section 35-1-77 of the 
Utah Code Annotated. (These sections are reproduced in the Apendum.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Applicant filed this appeal of a final decision by the Industrial Commission denying 
workers1 compensation benefits After convening a medical panel, the Administrative Law Judge 
("the ALJ,f) denied benefits because of the lack of medical causation between the Applicant's 
seizures and exposure to a Clorox cleaning solution used by the Applicant at work. The 
Commission denied the Applicant's motion for review. 
The following facts are relevant to the issues up for review. 
1. The Applicant worked as an animal control officer for the Davis County Animal 
Control Division from 1991 to August 11, 1993. (R.65, 67.) 
2. The Applicant's job duties included picking up stray animals which were put in 
portable kennels in back of the Applicant's pickup truck. Once the animals were removed, the 
portable kennels were cleaned with a Clorox cleaning solution. The Clorox cleaning solution was 
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a mixture of 30 parts water to one part bleach. The sprayer was marked as to the correct amount 
of Clorox to use for the Clorox/water mixture. The Clorox was of the type that could be bought 
in any grocery store. (R.65-66, 67.) 
3. Cleaning the kennels with the Clorox cleaning solution took between 30 seconds 
and 1 minute. The Applicant would have to clean two to six kennels per day, however cleaning 
two kennels per day was typical. (R.66.) 
4. Other chemicals used at the animal control facilities, but not by the Applicant 
included Excidor, a degreaser used by the maintenance personnel. Lemonfect, a disinfectant, was 
used to disinfect the kennels. Leashes used to restrain animals were dropped into a bucket 
containing Parvicide, an antiviral agent. (R.66, 67.) 
5. On June 1, 1993, and July 8, 1993 the Applicant suffered seizures. The Applicant 
had used the Clorox cleaning solution on these days. (R.66.) 
6. After the first seizure, the Weber County Crime Lab found no trace of any 
chemicals on the Applicant's pants. The investigation was performed in response to the allegation 
that perhaps the Applicant had been poisoned by someone who was "out to get him" for some 
unspecified reason. (R.67; note that the ALJ indicates this investigation was done after the 
second seizure on July 8, however it was completed after the first seizure.) 
7. The Applicant was under various stresses during the time he was employed as an 
animal control officer. He had recently sold his home, and was residing with in-laws and was 
trying to refinance a home. The Applicant was also feeling pressure from work from his 
supervisor, for not producing or performing up to her standards. (R.67.) 
8. The Applicant suffered two head injuries prior to his seizures which warranted 
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medical attention. In 1982, the Applicant suffered a concussion, and was hospitalized overnight, 
after being knocked "silly" in a fundraiser boxing match. In 1988, the Applicant suffered another 
concussion when he hit his head while loading a washing machine into a pickup truck. The 
Applicant was taken to the emergency room. (R.65.) 
9. The Applicant's physician, Dr. Roberta Hallquist, concluded that the Applicant 
suffered two generalized seizures, "post-traumatic variety, related to a remote concussion from a 
boxing injury in his teens, and an indirect head trauma due to being jarred or charged by a bull a 
year ago at work, plus occupational exposure to chlorine, and other chemical exposure on [sic] 
the work place. He has been maintained on anticonvulsant therapy with Dilantin, and has had an 
abnormal EEG." (R.178.) 
10. The Applicant's other physician, Dr. Dennis R. Peterson, stated "[a]s far as irritants 
that may have contributed to that first episode, Dr. Holquist [sic], the neurology specialist who 
has consulted on the case, felt that chlorine from using Chlorox in the standard way for cleansing 
the cage that he uses in his truck, etc., could make a significant contribution towards setting off an 
irritable focus." (R.180.) 
11. The independent medical evaluation, done by Dr. Fumisuke Matsuo, concluded 
that Clorox is an irritant and "overexposure would probably be obvious because of local mucosal 
irritation and possibly upper respiratory symptoms. It does not appear that [the Applicant] has 
suffered either acute or chronic symptoms suggestive of such toxic exposure. . . . At this time it 
would appear prudent to manage his seizure disorder as a condition of unknown etiology . . . ." 
(R.68, 166.) 
12. The ALJ appointed a medical panel consisting of Dr. Douglas E. Rollins, Director, 
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Center for Human Toxicology, and Dr. Madison H. Thomas, a neurologist. (R.68.) 
13. The medical panel conclusions, adopted by the ALJ were the following: 
a. There was no medically demonstrable causal connection between the Applicant's 
grand mal seizures on June 1 and July 8, 1993, and his work as an animal control officer for Davis 
County during 1991 through 1993. 
b. The Applicant's seizure problem consisted of two highly probable grand mal 
seizures. 
c. The Applicant did not have a nonwork-related disability which was affected by his 
Davis County work. 
d. The medical care the Applicant received since June 1, 1993, was not necessitated 
by exposure to chemicals while working for Davis County. 
e. There is no future medical care which can reasonably be expected to be 
necessitated by the Applicant's exposure. 
£ The Applicant does not appear to have any permanent impairment except for the 
anosmia and the seizure disorder, both which are considered nonindustrial. (R.68-69.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The ALJ used the correct standard of proof to determine whether the Applicant's seizures 
were triggered by his use of a Clorox cleaning solution while employed by Davis County. The 
ALJ's order and the record as a whole indicate that the ALJ applied the preponderance of 
evidence standard to determine medical causation. There is nothing in the ALJ's order which 
suggests the ALJ required medical causation be proven by "certainty." 
5 
The Commission's decision to deny workers' compensation benefits is supported by 
substantial evidence. The Applicant has failed to marshall the evidence supporting the 
Commission's finding of no medical causation, and show that despite the supporting facts the 
Commission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 
Finally, the Commission correctly denied workers' compensation benefits in the form of 
medical expenses even though the medical panel commented that the medical expenses were 
reasonable. The Commission has no authority to grant workers' compensation benefits once it 
determines there is no compensable injury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE APPLICANT'S SEIZURES 
WERE NOT WORK RELATED WAS BASED ON THE CORRECT 
STANDARD OF PROOF - THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 
The Applicant must prove by the preponderance of evidence that his seizures were caused 
by the exposure to a Clorox cleaning solution in the workplace. See, Lipman v. Indus. Comm'n., 
592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979) (the standard of proof to prove compensability is a preponderance of 
evidence). The preponderance of evidence standard requires the court to balance the evidence, 
using its discretion to weigh its importance and credibility, and decide whether it is more likely 
than not that the evidence supports the claimant's position. See, generally. State v. Hodges, 798 
P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990). The ALJ used the preponderance of evidence standard to deny 
workers' compensation benefits to the Applicant. 
To determine whether the correct standard of proof was used, a reviewing court considers 
both the record and the ALJ's order as a whole. Willardson v. Indus. Comm'n., 856 P.2d 371, 
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376 (Utah App. 1993) (ALJfs use of the word "significant" was unintended surplusage and did not 
support the allegation that the wrong standard of proof was used to show medical causation). In 
the instant case, the ALJ, after stating his findings of fact, concluded "[u]nder such 
circumstances, it has not been shown to a preponderance that the seizures were medically caused 
by the work at Davis County . . .." (R.70, emphasis added.) The ALTs conclusions of law stated 
"[t]here is insufficient evidence to show that [the Applicant's] grand mal seizures which occurred 
on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993 arouse out of and in the course of exposure to Clorox . . . ." 
(R.70.) 
A review of the ALTs order as a whole indicates the ALJ considered all the evidence 
presented by the Applicant. The ALTs findings of fact listed the conclusion of the Applicant's 
physician, the independent medical evaluation, and the medical panel's conclusions. The ALJ's 
exercised his discretion to give more weight to the findings of the medical panel (which included a 
physician who specialized in toxicology) and the independent medical evaluation, and less weight 
to the Applicant's own physician The ALJ also listed seven factors unrelated to work which were 
likely causative factors. (R.69-70.) The ALJ determined that "it was unlikely that the exposure 
to the Clorox cleaning solution was sufficient to cause any impact on the Applicant's cerebral 
functions." (R.69, emphasis added.) The ALJ's order as a whole demonstrates that the ALJ 
determined medical causation using the preponderance of evidence standard. Based on a review 
of the ALJ's decision, the Commission also determined that the correct standard of proof was 
applied. 
The Applicant asserts that the ALJ required medical causation be proven by certainty. 
The Applicant points to no language in the order, other then the ALJ's conclusion that there was 
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"insufficient" evidence to support medical causation, to support this allegation. (Petitioner's Brief, 
p. 13.) There is nothing in the ALJ's order which supports the Applicant's allegation that H[t]he 
ALJ erroneously assumed that the question of medical causation needed to be answered in 
absolute terms." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 14.) 
In conclusion, the ALJ applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine 
medical causation. The ALJ considered the evidence presented by the Applicant, but placed 
greater weight on the findings of the medical panel that the Applicant's seizures were not 
triggered by exposure to a Clorox cleaning solution at work. The ALJ did not require medical 
causation be proven with certainty. 
H. THE ALJ'S CONCLUSION THAT THE APPLICANT FAILED TO SHOW HIS 
EXPOSURE TO CLOROX CAUSED HIS SEIZURES IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. The Applicant Failed to Show That The ALJ's Finding Of No Medical Causation 
Is Against the Clear Weight of Evidence. 
Medical causation is a question of fact; questions of fact should be affirmed if they are 
supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." 
Virgin v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm'n.. 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah App. 1990). 
To challenge a findings of fact, a claimant is required to marshal "all of the evidence supporting 
the findings, then show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." King v. Indus. 
Comm'n.. 850P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993). Smallwood v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. 
Comm'n.. 841 P.2d 716, 718-19 (Utah App. 1992) (the claimant must marshall the evidence in 
support of the finding and then show the challenged finding is so lacking in support as to be 
8 
against the clear weight of evidence, making it clearly erroneous). 
The Applicant has failed to marshall the evidence supporting the finding that his use of a 
Clorox cleaning solution did not cause or contribute to his seizures. The Applicant has not shown 
that despite the conclusions of the medical panel that it was "quite unlikely" that the use of the 
Clorox could trigger his seizures, the ALJ's finding was not supported by substantial evidence. 
The Applicant fails to draw attention to any flaw in the evidence upon which the ALJ relied. See, 
Stewart v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm'n.. 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah App. 1992). The 
Applicant has not shown that the finding of no medical causation is against the clear weight of 
evidence. 
The Applicant has not met the procedural requirements for review by not marshalling the 
evidence, and showing that in spite of this evidence, the ALTs findings were not supported by 
substantial evidence. Therefore, ALJ's and the Commission's denial of workers' compensation 
benefits to the Applicant should be affirmed. 
B. The Applicant Failed To Establish That His Seizure Was Both Legally And 
Medically Caused By His Exposure to Clorox. 
The Applicant must establish by the preponderance of evidence that his exposure to 
Clorox caused his seizures, or contributed to the cause of his seizures. In Allen v. Indus. 
Comm'n.. 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986), the court outlined the two-part test to determine 
causation in workers' compensation cases. To establish legal causation, a claimant must show 
legal causation and medical causation to recover workers' compensation benefits. Id A claimant 
with pre-existing conditions "must show that the employment contributed something substantial 
to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life." Id To show increased risk, a claimant 
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must show an "unusual or extraordinary exertion11 to prove legal causation. IdL at 26. 
The Applicant used a Clorox cleaning solution a few minutes a day. The Clorox was the 
type sold in grocery stores for consumer use. In addition, the Clorox cleaning solution used was a 
mixture of thirty parts water and one part Clorox. This exposure or "exertion" hardly seems 
unusual or extraordinary. The Applicant provides no evidence which demonstrates that this 
exposure is substantially different than any regular use of household cleaners. 
Even if there is legal causation, a claimant still must establish medical causation, the 
second part of the Allen test. A claimant must show, by a preponderance of evidence that there is 
a "medically demonstrable causal link between the work-related exertions and the unexpected 
injuries that resulted from those strains." Id at 27. 
The Applicant's evidence regarding medical causation consists of conclusory statements by 
his two treating physicians that his seizures were caused by his exposure to chemicals. There is 
no evidence that these physicians evaluated the acute and chronic toxicity characteristics of the 
active chemical in Clorox (sodium hypochlorite). (In fact, Dr. Hallquist stated that the Applicant 
exposure was to chlorine. (R. 178.) Dr Peterson seemingly repeated this conclusion with no 
independent evaluation of his own. (R. 180.)) This was the only evidence the Applicant presented 
on medical causation. 
In contrast, both the independent medical evaluation ("the IME") and the medical panel 
evaluated the toxicity characteristics of sodium hypochlorite to determine if exposure to the 
Clorox cleaning solution could have triggered the Applicant's seizure. The medical panel 
concluded there was no medical causation stating: 
Our conclusion on this is based on an effort to balance various factors that may reasonably 
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be considered as contributory to the occurrence of isolated grand mal seizures. On the 
one hand, we have the suggestion that one of more of the chemical substances [the 
Applicant] was exposed to triggered these seizures. It seems quite unlikely that the 
exposure to the Clorox solution reached sufficient levels to cause any impact on his 
cerebral function since there does not appear to have been any of the observed prodromes 
[sic] of significant respiratory distress which ordinarily accompanied even slight exposures 
to any Clorox type spray. There is secondly, a significant delay in the occurrence after the 
last exposure, during which he was apparently able to function well, suggesting there was 
no acute involvement. Likewise, it is not reasonable that without major noticeable 
respiratory distress, that there would be any continuing effects of the Clorox type 
exposure on an accumulative basis. The other two, the detergent and the Parvosol, are 
not of the nature which are likely to produce a convulsive seizure, especially where there 
was no indication of effect at the time of exposure. (R.43, emphasis added.) 
The Applicant argues that the ALJ, the IME and "especially the medical panel" failed to 
consider whether the Applicant's exposure to Clorox could have contributed to his seizures 
considering his previous head injuries. The medical panel's reports indicates that the panel did in 
fact consider and balance all the factors which could have contributed to the Applicant's seizure. 
There is nothing in the medical panel's report which supports the Applicant's assertion that the 
panel "approached this case in an either/or, all or nothing, manner." (Petitioner's Brief, p.26.) 
To summarize, the Applicant failed to establish by the preponderance of evidence that his 
work exposure to the Clorox cleaning solution caused or contributed to his seizures. The medical 
panel considered all contributing factors which could have triggered the Applicant's seizures. 
Based on the toxicity characteristics of sodium hypochlorite (the active ingredient in Clorox), the 
medical panel concluded it was "quite unlikely" that the Applicant's use of the Clorox cleaning 
solution could have triggered his seizures. Accordingly, the ALJ adopted the medical panels 
findings. 
C. The ALJ's Finding Of No Medical Causation Is Supported By Substantial 
Evidence. 
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The ALJ's conclusion that the Applicant has failed to establish medical causation is 
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is "that which a reasonable person might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." King v. Indus. Comm'n.. 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 
(Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). A substantial evidence review "simply accords deference to 
the agency where two reasonable, yet conflicting conclusions could have been reached." Id. 
The evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion included the findings of both the IME and 
the medical panel that the Applicant's use of the Clorox cleaning solution was insufficient to 
trigger the Applicant's seizures. This decision was based on the acute and chronic toxicity 
characteristics of the active chemical in Clorox (sodium hypochlorite) and the conditions under 
which the Applicant used the Clorox cleaning solution. The ALJ's decision was also based on 
non-work related factors which could have caused the seizures. These factors included a prior 
history of head injuries, the Applicant's anosmia, an EEG abnormality, low blood sugar during one 
of his seizures, and long standing evidence of asymmetry of the lateral ventricles of the brain. 
(R.69-70.) 
The findings by the ALJ and the Commission are supported by substantial evidence. 
Therefore, the Commission's decision to deny workers' compensation benefits to the Applicant 
should be affirmed. 
HI. THE APPLICANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF MEDICAL 
EXPENSES BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMPENSABLE INJURY. 
The ALJ correctly denied the payment of the Applicant's medical expenses because there 
was no compensable injury. Section 35-1-45 of the Utah Code provides that an employee who is 
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injured by an "accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. . . shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury . . . . The responsibility of compensation 
and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines . . . shall be on the employer 
and its insurance carrier.. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994). Employers and their insurance 
carrier are not responsible for medical expenses unless there is a compensable injury. As the ALJ 
and Commission determined there was no compensable injury, workers' compensation benefits in 
the form of medical expenses are not the responsibility of Davis County nor the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah. 
The Applicant argues that because the medical panel stated that the medical care the 
Applicant received was justified, the ALJ should have required the Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah to pay medical expenses. This argument is without merit for several reasons. 
Section 35-1-77 of the Utah Code Annotated gives the Commission discretion in adopting 
the findings of the medical panel if there is other substantial evidence in the case supporting a 
contrary finding. Where there is statutory discretion given to an agency, the appropriate standard 
of review is the abuse of discretion. King v. Indus. Comm'n.. 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 
1993). The ALJ properly exercised his discretion not to grant medical expenses even though the 
medical panel stated that the medical care was justified. The "substantial evidence" requirement in 
section 35-1-77 was met by the medical panel's finding that the Applicant's seizures were not 
work related. Workers' compensation benefits, including medical expenses, are granted only 
when there is a compensable injury. The Commission does not have the discretion to grant 
workers' compensation benefits unless it determines the Applicant's condition was both legally and 
medically caused by an industrial injury. 
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In addition, the Commission is the ultimate fact finder in workers1 compensation cases. 
Virgin v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm'n.. 803 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App. 1990). In 
Virgin, the claimant argued that because the medical panel stated that his industrial injury 
aggravated a pre-existing condition, he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits even 
though the medical panel was unable to clearly assign any degree of impairment to his industrial 
accident. IdL at 1287. In upholding the Commission's denial of benefits, the court stated that "the 
Commission will not be reversed simply because it has chosen to rely on one portion of the 
medical panel report and to reject other inconsistent portions." Id at 1289-90. 
In the instant case, the ALJ and the Commission relied on the medical panel's findings of 
no medical causation to conclude there was insufficient evidence to show that the Applicant's 
seizures arose out of and in the course of the use of Clorox and other chemicals while employed 
by Davis County. Thus, the Commission appropriately denied workers' compensation benefits 
because there was no compensable injury. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission correctly required the Applicant to prove his seizures were the result of 
his use of a Clorox cleaning solution by the preponderance of evidence. The Commission 
decision to deny workers' compensation benefits to the Applicant is supported by substantial 
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evidence. Therefore, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah requests this court affirm the 
Commission's denial of workers' compensation benefits to the Applicant. 
Respectfully submitted t h i s ^ S ^ a y of June, 1995. 
MARKDJ5EAN 
Attorney for Respondents 
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STATUTES 
§ 35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each such 
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever 
such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation 
for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as 
provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on 
the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994) 
35-1-77. Medical panel - Medical director or medical consultants - Discretionary authority of 
commission to refer case - Findings and reports - Objections to report - Hearing - Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier denies 
liability, the commission may refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by 
the commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to an occupational 
disease is filed with the commission, the commission shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, 
appoint an impartial medical panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing in the treatment of the 
disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical 
aspects of a controverted case, the commission may employ a medical director or medical 
consultants on a full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence 
and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding responsibility. If all parties 
agree to the use of a medical director or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in 
the same manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall make such study, take 
such X-rays, and perform such tests, including post-mortem examinations if authorized by the 
commission, as it may determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall make a report in writing 
to the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and also make such additional findings 
as the commission may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for 
remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the 
panel, results from the occupational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, 
prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so, the extent in 
percentage to which the other causes have so contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to the applicant, the 
employer, and its insurance carrier by certified mail with return receipt requested. Within 15 days 
after the report is deposited in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its 
insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no written 
objections are filed within that period, the report is considered admitted in evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the report if other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case for hearing to 
determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, any party so desiring may request the 
commission to have the chairman of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical 
consultants present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown, 
the commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the chairman or the 
medical director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing for examination and 
cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received 
as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is 
sustained by the testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical 
consultants and the expenses of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1994). 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
IVAN D. THOMPSON * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
VS. * 
* 
DAVIS COUNTY and WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH# * 
* Case Nos. 93-1036 
Defendants. * and 93-1037 
* 
Ivan D. Thompson seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's 
Order which denied Mr. Thompson's claim for compensation under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
ALJ's decision. In summary, Mr. Thompson worked as an animal 
control officer for Davis County. His employment required that he 
use various disinfecting agents to clean animal cages. 
On June 1 and again on July 8, 1993, Mr. Thompson experienced 
grand mal seizures while at work. Dr. Hallquist, Mr. Thompson's 
treating physician, attributed such seizures to Mr. Thompson's 
exposure to the disinfecting agents used at his work. Dr. Matsuo, 
from the University of Utah's Neurology Department, concluded that 
Mr. Thompson's seizures were not caused by the disinfecting agents. 
Due to the difference of medical opinion in this matter, the 
ALJ appointed a medical panel which reviewed Mr. Thompson's records 
and examining Mr. Thompson himself. The panel found no causal 
connection between Mr. Thompson's seizures and the disinfecting 
agents used at his work. 
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Based on the medical panel,s report, the ALJ concluded Mr. 
Thompson had failed to establish that his work caused his seizures. 
The ALJ therefore denied Mr. Thompson's claim for workers' 
compensation benefits. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Workers7 Compensation Act requires payment of 
compensation and medical benefits to workers injured by accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment. It is the 
obligation of the worker claiming such benefits to establish a 
causal connection between work and injury. In this case, the ALJ 
concluded Mr. Thompson had failed to prove a causal relationship 
between his work and his injuries. 
Mr. Thompson's Motion For Review alleges the ALJ required Mr. 
Thompson to prove causation "to a certainty," thereby applying a 
too-stringent standard of proof on Mr. Thompson. However, the 
Commission's review of the ALJ's decision shows that the ALJ 
applied the correct standard of proof, preponderance of the 
evidence, to Mr. Thompson's claim. 
Mr. Thompson also contends the ALJ's decision failed to 
address Mr. Thompson's assertion that exposure to disinfecting 
agents at work may have combined with his preexisting sensitivity 
to chemicals, thereby resulting in a compensable industrial injury. 
While a combination of nonindustrial and industrial causes can, 
under some circumstances, combine to produce a compensable injury, 
it is necessary for the applicant to establish such circumstances 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Mr. Thompson has failed to do 
so in this case. 
Finally, Mr. Thompson alleges the ALJ erred in denying all 
workers' compensation benefits. In effect, Mr. Thompson suggests 
that the ALJ should have awarded medical expenses to Mr. Thompson, 
despite the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Thompson did not suffer a 
compensable injury. The Commission finds no merit to this 
contention. Medical benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act 
are limited to payment for medical expenses necessary to care for 
an industrial injury. Here, there was no industrial injury. 
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ORDER 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of Ivan D. Thompson, Case No.s 93-1036 and 
93-1037, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, this£->-&day of 
December, 1994, to the following: 
DAVID J. HOLDSWORTH 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
185 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
ERIE V. BOORMAN 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND 
P O BOX 146611 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
MARK DEAN 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
P 0 BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157-0929 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
AH\93-1036 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 93-1036 
*J. THOMPSON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
DAVIS COUNTY and/or WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * 
and/or EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE * 
FUND OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * I * A * * * * * * 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on 
February 2, 1994 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant, ivan B. Thompson, was present and 
represented by David A. Holdsworth, Attorney at 
Law. 
The defendant employer, Davis County, and its 
insurer, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
were represented by Mark Dean, Attorney at Law. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie V, Boorman, Attorney at Law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
This hearing was initially scheduled for December 12, 1993. 
The applicant underwent surgery, and upon his request and the 
concurrence of the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (WCF), the 
hearing was delayed until February 2, 1994. 
The preliminary findings of fact, and the proposed questions 
for the medical panel were sent to the parties on February 17, 1994 
allowing them 15 days to make objections. The applicant proposed 
some changes to the preliminary findings and instructions to the 
medical panel, and where the requested changes were not 
inconsistent with the facts as determined from the hearing, the 
proposed changes were made. After receipt of the medical films and 
X-rays, the case was referred to the medical panel on March 4, 
1994, and the medical panel report was received by the Commission 
on June 9, 1994. 
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On June 9, 1994, the medical panel report was sent to the 
parties with instructions to reply not later than the close-of-
business on June 24, 1994. Objections were received from the 
applicant by fax on June 24, 1994. No objections were received 
from the defendants. 
The objections from the applicant to the medical panel report 
have been reviewed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant, Ivan D. Thompson, at the time of the 
alleged injuries on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993, was employed by 
Davis County Animal Control. 
2. The applicant had the following work and educational 
experiences: From 1981-83 he attended college; from 1983-85 he 
served and completed a mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints; in 1985 he returned home and thereafter in 1986-
87 he worked for the California Protection Agency; in 1988-89 he 
worked for Beehive Clothing as a preshrink material fabric 
operator; in 1990 he worked for Sysco Intermountain Foods, and in 
1991 he went to work for Davis County as an animal control officer. 
3. As an animal control officer, the applicant picked up 
animals; answered emergency calls in relation to animals; helped 
return livestock; sold animal licenses, and performed other related 
duties. 
4. In 1982 while attending college the applicant sustained a 
head injury while boxing in a fund-raiser when he was knocked 
"silly," and was hospitalized overnight. He was told by medical 
personnel that he had suffered a concussion. 
5. In 1988 the applicant suffered another concussion when he 
was loading a washing machine into a pickup truck and hit his head 
on the crest of the door. He went to the emergency room on the 
same day. 
6. The applicant has no sense of smell (anosmia). 
7. After working for a short time as an animal control 
officer prior to the alleged injuries related to the instant claim, 
a large animal described as a bull, cow, or calf, depending on 
which witness was testifying, knocked the applicant to the ground. 
He experienced pain in his chest, and he was in the hospital 
overnight. 
8. Among the applicant'& duties was the task to pick up 
animals. Depending on the size of the animal, the applicant would 
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place the critter into a kennel which was approximately the 
following dimensions: one foot by one foot by one foot (which was 
called a "cat" kennel) , or three feet by two feet and one half foot 
by two and one half feet (dog kennel) , or a three feet by three 
feet by four feet (large dog kennel) . The applicant would then 
take the portable kennel, and place it in the bed of his pickup 
truck which has a covered she!1 on the back of a pickup truck. 
9. The applicant would drive his pickup into the garage 
facility which was described as "large enough to house a dump 
truck." The applicant would take the portable kennel out of his 
pickup truck, and place it on the floor of the garage. If the 
animal was a dog, the leash used to restrain the animal would be 
dropped into a bucket containing Parvo disinfectant, a disinfectant 
for parvovirus. The last step in the process of handling the 
animal would be for the applicant to spray the portable dog kennel 
with a solution of Clorox and water. The Clorox was mixed to a 
solution containing 30 parts of water to one part of Clorox. The 
applicant described the Clorox as the same as that which can be 
bought at any grocery store. 
10. The clorox spray typically took from 30 seconds to one 
minute per kennel and the applicant would have to spray anywhere 
from two to six kennels per day. A typical day included only two 
kennels. 
11. On June 1, 1993, the applicant cleaned his portable 
kennel before going back into the field. He sprayed it with water, 
used a scrub brush, and the Clorox water spray. He got into his 
truck, but does not remember anything after that. The applicant's 
next recollection was when he saw his wife that afternoon. He 
experienced tongue pain at which time he went to his doctor. The 
applicant was "soaking wet from the waist down," and had some green 
vegetation resembling moss on his pants. 
12. At that time the applicant was admitted to the hospital 
and was kept there for three days. Thereafter he returned to work 
on June 2 2, 2 993. 
13. On July 8, 1993, the applicant picked up a dog and then 
cleaned his kennel with the water and clorox. He went home for 
lunch. The applicant next remembered that "the paramedics came 
through the back door." He looked down and saw vomit on the floor. 
He was placed in an ambulance, and was taken to Lakeview Hospital 
in Bountiful. 
14. The Parvicide is an antiviral agent used to kill a virus 
("Parvo) which is exclusive to dogs. 
15. The Clorox solution was mixed by a maintenance worker and 
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was contained in a portable weed sprayer. The kennels would be 
sprayed in the garage, and would be left to air dry. The animal 
control officer would then take a dry kennel, and put it into his 
truck. 
16. The sprayer was marked as to the correct amount of Clorox 
which should be used in preparation of the clorox/water mixture. 
17. The facilities were inspected regularly by the Humane 
Society of Utah to insure that all substances in use would not be 
injurious to animals, in the event the animals stood in the 
liquids. 
18. Other chemicals used by the animal control facilities, 
but not by the other officers or the applicant, was Excidor, a 
degreaser used by maintenance personnel. The degreaser was used to 
remove grease excreted by dogs. Also previously used was Lemon-
feet which was the officers to disinfect kennels prior to the use 
of the clorox solution. 
19. Mr. Thompson was under various stresses during the time 
he was employed as an animal control officer. He had recently sold 
his home; he was residing with in-laws; and, he was trying to re-
finance a home. The employer was also causing pressure on the 
applicant for not producing or performing up to her standards. The 
record indicates that the applicant was having trouble with his 
license sales. 
20. There was no evidence presented that Davis County sprayed 
insect spray or other contaminants around the animal control 
facility within several days prior to the applicants industrial 
incidents. The evidence shows that mosquito spray was not used 
within the zone in which the applicant would have expected to be 
working. 
21. The Weber County Crime Lab found no trace of any 
poisonous chemicals on the pants that the applicant was wearing at 
the time of admission to the hospital on July 8. This 
investigation was performed in response to an allegation that 
perhaps the applicant had been poisoned by someone who was "out to 
get him11 for some unspecified reason. 
22. On June 22, 1993, the applicant was depressed and 
withdrawn. He indicated that he was tired and ready to collapse. 
23. The applicant was terminated on August 13, 1993, from his 
position because the employer thought that he was "dishonest,ff and 
had embellished many of his problems. 
24. No other employee has ever had any adverse reaction to 
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the chemicals .:it the facility. 
25. Dr. Roberta Hallquist, a physician at the Lakeview 
Hospital, determined over a period of time that the applicant had 
experienced grand mal seizures as a result of the applicant's 
exposure to the Clorox solution and other chemicals used at his 
employment. Dr. Hallquist prescribed Dilantin for the applicant. 
26. Dr. Fumizuke Matsuo from the University of Utah 
Department of Neurology evaluated the applicant and his medical 
records and radiological study reports, but was not able to review 
the applicant's original films. Dr. Matsuo concluded that "it does 
not appear that Mr. Thompson" had suffered either acute or chronic 
symptoms suggesting a toxic exposure." He was not sure if he had 
any strong reasons to consider neuro-toxicity of sodium 
hypochlorite as an explanation for the applicant's seizures, 
although he indicated that it would appear prudent to manage Mr. 
Thompson's seizure disorder as a condition of unknown etiology. He 
further agreed with Dr. Hallquist's decision to place the applicant 
on an anti-epileptic drug. Dr. Matsuo concluded that reevaluation 
in one year was recommended and that the applicant could come off 
phenytoin if Mr. Thompson remained without recurrent symptoms. 
With regard to the contribution of the Clorox solution (sodium 
hypochlorite), he did not feel that there was any strong reason to 
consider that solution as a toxic substance. 
27. The medical panel consisted of Dr. Rawlins (toxicologist) 
and Dr. Thomas (neurologist and chair). The panel met on May 17, 
1994, reviewed the file and history, and examined the applicant as 
well as discussed the applicant's problems with the applicant's 
wife. 
28. The panel concluded in terms of reasonab]«?' medical 
probability the following: 
a. There is not a medically demonstrable causal 
connection between the applicant's 1 June 1993 and 8 July 1993 
grand mal seizures and his work as an animal control officer in 
Davis County during 1991 through 1993. 
b. The applicant's seizure problem consisted of two 
highly probable grand mal seizures. 
c. The applicant did not have a nonwork-related 
disability which was affected by his Davis County work. 
d. The medical care which the applicant received since 
1 June 1993 was not necessitated by exposure to chemicals while 
working for Davis County during the relevant periods. 
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e. There is no future medical care which can reasonably 
be expected to be necessitated by the applicant's exposure. 
f. The applicant does not appear to have any permanent 
impairment except for the anosmia and the seizure disorder, both of 
which are considered nonindustrial. 
29. The judge adopts the findings of the medical panel as his 
own. 
DISCUSSION: 
Counsel for the applicant has done a commendable job in 
providing a thorough analysis as to why this case should be decided 
in favor of the applicant. However, medical causation is lacking, 
and the weight of the medical opinion is contrary to a finding of 
medical causation. 
The medical panel as well as Dr. Matsuo concluded that it was 
unlikely that the exposure to the Clorox solution was sufficient to 
cause any impact on the applicants cerebral function. There were 
none of the normal prodromes of significant respiratory distress 
which ordinarily accompany even slight exposure to any Clorox type 
spray. Additionally, there was a significant delay in the 
occurrence of a seizure after the last exposure. During this 
delay, the applicant was apparently able to function well which 
suggested to the medical panel that there was no acute involvement. 
In the absence of major noticeable respiratory distress, it is 
not reasonable for there to be any continuing effects of the Clorox 
type exposure on a cumulative basis. Also, there is no indication 
that exposure to other agents including the detergent and the 
Parvosol could have produced a convulsive seizure. 
There are other clues unrelated to the applicant's work at 
Davis County which predated his employment with Davis County and 
are likely the causative factors. These are noted by the medical 
panel to be: 
a. The likelihood of an injury which ruptured the 
olfactory fibers as they came down through the lamina cribrosa 
beneath the frontal lobes of the brain. The evidence shows that 
the applicant's anosmia predated his work at Davis County. 
b. There is history of an abnormal ventricle consistent 
with an injury back in 1988. A localized EEG abnormality is 
recorded which is not likely the result of a diffuse general toxic 
agent. 
c. The applicant had a concussion in a boxing match 
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while in college sufficient to require emergency room care, and 
sufficient to require him to miss a period of school. 
d. He hit his head on the door frame of his vehicle. 
This was severe enough to cause him to obtain a CT scan at the 
time. 
e. His low blood sugar noted during one of his seizures 
would not have occurred from exposure to the chemicals. 
f. There is long standing evidence of asymmetry of the 
lateral ventricles of the brain. 
g. The suggestion that his anosmia might have allowed 
him to have a greater exposure is negated by his intolerance to 
even minimal exposures to gasoline, paint, or to the Clorox. 
The applicant was exposed to small household and laundry type 
concentrations of Clorox. There was no evidence that any other 
members of the Davis County animal control section ever became ill 
as a result of the exposures. 
Under such circumstances, it has not been shown to a 
preponderance that the seizures were medically caused by the work 
at Davis County, and this case must therefore be dismissed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
There is insufficient evidence to show that Ivan D. Thompson's 
grand mal seizures which occurred on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993 
arose out of and in the course of exposure to Clorox and other 
chemicals related to his employment for Davis County. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the claims of Ivan D. Thompson for 
worker's compensation benefits based upon exposure to Clorox and 
other chemicals used while employed by Davis County, allegedly 
resulting in grand mal seizures on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993, 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the opposing parties shall have 15 days from the date 
of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response 
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with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2) . 
DATED THIS day of July 1994. 
"UTAH 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^ day of July 1994, the 
attached ORDER in the case of Ivan D. Ttfbmpson was mailed, postage 
prepaid to the following persons at the following addresses: 
Ivan Thompson 
595 N 800 W 
W Bountiful UT 84087 
David J. Holdsworth, Atty 
185 S State #500 
Salt Lake City UT 8 4111 
Mark Dean, Atty 
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (Drop Box) 
Erie V. Boorman, Atty 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Jm\e S. Harrison, Par 
Abjudication Division 
alegal 
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MEDICAL PANEL REPORT 
MADISON H. THOMAS, M.D. 
8TH AVENUE & C STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84143 
Benjamin A. Sims 
Administrative Law Judge 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 E. 300 So./P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Re: Ivan D. Thompson 
Inj: 6-1-93 & 7-8-93 
Emp: Davis County 
REPORT OF MEDICAL PANEL 
A medical panel consisting of Drs. Douglas Rawlins (toxicologist) and Madison H. Thomas 
(neurologist), with the latter as chairman, met to evaluate the case of Ivan D. Thompson, with 
reference to an injuries reported to have occurred on 1 June 1993 and 8 July 1993. 
The file made available to the panel was reviewed by the panel members, and the history was 
reviewed in detail with him and separately with his wife. He was examined by the panel members, 
and X-rays were reviewed. Additional information as to the components of various substances was 
received from the Davis County Animal Control Center and has been included in the panel's 
report. The Preliminary Findings of Fact was used as a general outline in reviewing his history. 
The applicant indicates that presently, he feels he is getting along reasonably well. He is taking 
Dilantin 600 mg a day and is also taking Coumadin because of the blood clot and pulmonary 
embolus last November. He does not feel either of these cause him any difficulty. He has 
occasional headaches for which he takes Motrin. He has not returned to work, but has plans to 
go to massage therapy school in the near future. The applicant is apprehensive and will not go 
anywhere where Clorox may be, as he has the impression that this has caused the seizures. 
Likewise, he cannot stand to be near an automobile when it is being gassed up because of the 
smell of the gasoline. His wife has to take the car to gas it up from time to time when he is not 
there. She also has to do some of her housecleaning at home when he is away. 
The applicant indicates he had been working doing essentially the same job for the Davis County 
Animal Control unit for about two and a half years. On 1 June 1993, he was engaged in his usual 
tasks. He recalls having breakfast and lunch which he recalls as being adequate. He had cleaned 
one or two kennels before going into the field 
He describes the sequence of cleaning a kennel as involving first spraying it with water and then 
cleaning it with a degreaser preparation. This is something that is sprayed on and then is rubbed 
with a brush with a two- or three-foot-long handle, so that his hands usually did not become 
contaminated with the degreaser. He indicates there may be some spillage, but usually the 
degreaser is handled with a long-handled brush. After this, the kennel was sprayed, and then he 
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would spray the kennel with a Clorox solution and turn it so that the kennel could dry. He recalls 
putting enough Clorox onto the kennel that he could actually see the Hquld rather than just 
covering it with a spray. Each kennel took about a half minute to spray adequately. After doing 
this, he would take some paper work into the office and then go and pick up the kennel and the 
dog lease. All of this work was done in a large room with two-car-garage-type doors which were 
normally open during the summer months, so that he believes the area was relatively well 
ventilated in this way. 
He understands that he was observed to stop at a roadside shop after leaving the animal shelter. 
He next recalls seeing his wife and apparently complained to her that his tongue hurt. The 
applicant drove his own vehicle to the doctor, and his wife next saw him in the doctor's office but 
she did not follow immediately behind him, He was hospitalized, but was not placed on any 
anticonvulsant medication. He did not return to work until June 22, 1993. 
On return to work, he resumed his regular duties. On 8 July 1993, he picked up a dog and took 
it to the shelter, after which he cleaned a kennel in the usual fashion and went home for lunch. 
When he did not return, the other workers called, but became concerned and called the paramedics 
who went to his house. The applicant recalls that he became aware of vomit on the floor and in 
other parts of the house. He was taken by ambulance to Lakeview Hospital where additional 
studies were done. His tongue had been bitten again. He was seen by Dr. Hallquist and was told 
that he couldn't return to his regular work and could not drive a car for six months, so he stopped 
driving. His tongue gradually improved. He reports being followed with a gradually increasing 
dose of Dilantin up to 600 mg per day. 
Additional information was provided by De Ann Hess of the Department of Animal Care and 
Control for Davis County. She indicated that the preparation Parvosol was not a preparation they 
ordinarily used, but they were given a gallon by a salesman as a sample, so they did use it. This 
was diluted with water and was used to soak the leashes which had been used by the control 
officers. When they returned to the center, they would drop the leash into a sink, and then a 
shelter technician would process them further, and after being soaked for a time, would hang the 
leashes up to dry. The animal control officers would not have any direct involvement with the 
Parvosol, but would take a dry leash with them when they would go out on another call. The 
applicant indicates he had no indication of any skin reaction or other problems from the use of the 
leashes. 
Details of the contents of the Parvosol are as shown in the attached copies which are attached to 
this report 
Ms. Hess indicates that the Excidor was something that was very expensive and was used only by 
maintenance personnel and was never used by the officers. 
The degreaser that would have been used by the applicant at that time, according to Ms. Hess, was 
a product called Lemoset, whose characteristics are likewise enumerated in the attached listing. 
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This was used with a spray device and matches what the applicant describes as a degreaser used 
after the water and before the chlorine spray was used. 
It is noted from the Preliminary Findings of Fact that a number of contributing factors have been 
evaluated. For example, mosquito spray had not been used in the area where the applicant was 
working. There were no poisonous chemicals on his trousers at the time of admission to the 
hospital. Other employers are not said to have had any adverse reaction to the chemicals at the 
facility. 
The applicant's wife was interviewed separately. She recalls that in the June episode when she 
saw him at home, he seemed very tired and complained that his tongue hurt. She did not have any 
clue that there was a seizure involved and encouraged him to drive his own car to Dr. Peterson's 
office. She understood Dr. Peterson felt he may have been exposed to a pesticide in some area 
where he was working. 
She indicated that on July 8th, he had left work to go home for lunch, but when he did not return, 
an ambulance was sent for him, and she did not see him until after he was hospitalized. She 
indicated that after being released from the hospital, he seemed relatively tired and quite concerned 
about getting back to work. She explained the situation of his job being terminated. She 
understood that Dr. Hallquist said he should not go back to an area where there was the Clorox 
smell in the area His wife felt that the supervisors felt he was withholding information when they 
did not get reports from the doctors as soon as they expected them. She indicated that after the 
second seizure, he seemed to be bothered by gas fumes when the car was being filled with gas, 
and a couple of weeks afterwards, he reported feeling nauseated and light-headed. He also gets 
headache sometimes when exposed to strong perfume, and usually he just leaves the area and the 
headache goes away. 
When asked about the situation of living with her parents, she indicated this was a temporary 
arrangement since they had sold their house and were in the process of building their new one. 
She feels it was a very fortuitous arrangement, as it made it easier for them than had it been 
otherwise. She indicates he has not been seriously depressed, although concerned about not being 
able to drive, since this has an impact on his ability to work at what he had been doing for a 
number of years. 
Ike applicant indicates his current age is 31. He is 5 feet 6 inches tall and weighs 242 pounds, 
having been a maximum of 260. He is ambidextrous. He writes with his right hand and eats with 
his left hand, but can do many things with both hands. He recalls childhood chickenpox without 
complications. He has fractured both ankles at different times, with these being treated with casts 
without problems. He fractured the left ankle again three years ago and has no current problems. 
He developed a problem with ingrown toenails in 1989, but has had no subsequent problems from 
them. In 1990, he was hurt when a 20-pound box fell about 20 feet on him. He had a backache 
for a time, but has had no current back symptoms. He hasn't had any difficulty with hearing, 
swallowing, chewing, talking, etc. Blood pressure has always been normal. He has had no ulcer 
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or GI symptoms. He denies any respiratory difficulties, though occasionally he feels he gets 
stuffed up, but without any particular time of year or known reason. He Has never had any 
respiratory symptoms at work. In July 1992, he had a dog bite on his left* hand and was given a 
tetanus shot, but has had no problems with that. 
In October 1993, he was operated on for fibrous dysplasia which required a craniotomy and 
operating in the area of the right eye, with apparently no penetration into the cerebral cavity and 
no impairment of the eye subsequently. In November 1993, he developed a thrombosis in the right 
leg and an embolus went to his lungs, which he recalls as causing a great deal of pain. He was 
subsequently put on Coumadin and continues on this to the present time. For many years, he has 
had a feeling of sensitivity to bananas and mustard, and may develop vomiting, diarrhea, cramps, 
or chest pains with exposure to these. 
The applicant reviewed various neurologic events. As far as he knows, he was able to stand and 
walk at the usual ages. He believes he had difficulty smelling things as long as he can remember. 
When his brother was being checked by an ear, nose, and throat physician, his mother asked him 
to check the applicant as well. He understands that he just checked his ability to smell and did 
not further tests. He does not fed his condition has changed in recent years. He has had 
occasions when he feels light-headed when he is exposed to pain, gasoline, or chlorine smells, and 
in the past year has studiously tvoided being around any kind of paint or gasoline smells. 
The applicant indicates that in 1982 or 1983, while in college, he was boxing with some Golden 
Gloves boxers and was apparently struck hard enough that he was knocked down. He indicates 
the paramedics took him to the hospital, and he was told he had a concussion. 
In 1988, he indicates he was holding something in his hand and bumped his head up against die 
frame of the driver's side door as he was getting into the vehicle. He developed headache and 
vomited and felt inclined to "he around" He was taken to the hospital at the time and was again 
told that he had had a "slight concussion." It is noted that a CT scan done at that time showed 
some asymmetry of the left frontal ventricular horn. 
He indicates that sometime after he started work at the Davis County Animal control Center, 
approximately three years ago, he was trying to control a "critter" weighing 300-400 pounds when 
it came straight at him and struck him on the chest. He was not knocked out, but was hospitalized 
for observation, apparently there being a concern about the possible cardiac effects from the blow, 
although there was no apparent concern about a cerebral effect at the time. 
The applicant indicates that in addition to boxing, he has been extensively involved in karate, and 
when his attention was recalled to the medical notes, he indicates that a week before his first 
seizure in June 1993, he suffered a blow to his face, which he reported. He does not think he was 
knocked out and does not recall any bruising of the face at the time. 
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The applicant indicates he was bom in Wyoming and attended high school >here. He qualified for 
a national honorary society for three years, with grades in the 3.7 to 3.9 range. He attended three 
years of physical therapy training before leaving on a mission to the Philippines. He qualified for 
an associate degree in sciences. 
The highlights of the record include a report on 1 June 1993 by Dr. Peterson who noted a gap of 
45 minutes which was not accounted for, apparently during which time he returned home 
staggering with his clothes wet and being slow of speech, etc., although apparently, according to 
his wife, he would have had to negotiated the freeway to get home. He reported nausea and 
having been wet from the chest down. He did not smell of urine. There was no indication of head 
injury, but the tongue showed bite marks and speech was thick and difficult and slow. The blood 
sugar was 53, and he was given sugar, and later it was 70. On 7 June, he reported feeling nausea 
and dizziness, but was able to ambulate. On 11 January, he was cleared for light duty. He 
returned to regular duty with the various investigations previously referred apparently being 
negative. 
He was reviewed on 8 July 1993 by Roberta Hallquist. She recorded the history very much as it 
has been previously recorded. He was found to have garbled speech and a bitten tongue when his 
employer called him at home. He complained of headache and drowsiness and reported he had 
been watching television (although his wife indicates the television was not turned on). He had 
myalgia, as well as the sore tongue. He had had several bouts of watery dianhea five days before, 
but this resolved. She recorded the injury when he was knocked to the ground by the young bull, 
striking his torso and buttocks, but without injuring his head. Neurologic examination was 
essentially negative, although the first cranial nerve was not checked. 
She started him on Dilantin and indicated he should not drive a vehicle because of the two 
seizures. 
Notes pertinent to his subsequent surgery for fibrous dysplasia have been reviewed and this does 
not appear to be related to the present condition. 
On 29 December 1993, he was seen by Dr. Matsuo where the history was slightly different, in that 
he interpreted the loss of smell function as being gradual and that there was no history suggestive 
of any head injury. He reviewed the two episodes and interpreted these as being seizures. He 
subsequently expressed some uncertainty about the likelihood of both seizures being caused by the 
exposure to the Clorox spray. 
It is noted that his first waking and sleeping EEG was normal in June, and the second one in July 
with sleep deprivation was abnormal. 
Laboratory studies were negative. 
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The applicant's mother called the panel chairman by telephone. She indicates that he was the 
result of a normal, healthy pregnancy and normal delivery. He walked at. about 11 months and 
began school at the age of 6. She does not recall the exact age, but when" he was a small child, 
she took her other son to an ENT specialist about his ears, and she asked him to check our 
applicant's ears, and he found they were satisfactory. At that time, he checked him for ability to 
smell and found that he could not She does not recall any unusual food habits or other differences 
about him with reference to smell throughout his growing years. He had his tonsils and adenoids 
removed, and had his wisdom teeth extracted before leaving on his mission. She indicated he did 
not have whooping cough, but did have mumps and chicken pox and croup on occasion when he 
was small. She indicates he did well with school, being among the best in the class of 13 in his 
high school. The family had a horse, but she does not recall any falls or being kicked. She 
indicates the boxing took place in college and was a fund-raising event when the local college 
students boxed a group of Golden Gloves competitors. She was not present at the time, but she 
indicated he had sufficient symptoms from his "concussion" that he missed so much school that 
he did not go back until the following quarter. She does not recall any seizure type of activity 
during his youth or childhood. He had no significant illnesses while on his mission in the 
Philippines. 
She expressed great concern that he might have another convulsion if he was inadvertently 
anywhere near a Clorox solution. 
EXAMINATION: 
Examination reveals a young man of about stated age who appeared in a good general state of 
health. He sat throughout the history taking without difficulty and showed no impairment of 
walking, standing, or balance. He is very stocky in build and heavily muscled in all extremities. 
He was oriented for time and place, etc. He recalled the current president and other more recent 
presidents, but reversed Bush and Reagan. He had difficulty with serial sevens, but did serial fives 
promptly. He was relatively literal in handling proverbs, but denied any significant depression, 
undue anxiety, or apprehension, other than his concern about having another convulsion if he were 
exposed to Clorox or similar agents. 
Blood pressure was 110/75. Pulse was regular, and the heart and lungs were not remarkable. 
The head showed no obvious deformities. There was no tenderness. The appUcant indicated he 
could not detect the presence of a mild olfactory stimulus, nor of an alcohol-soaked cotton pad 
under either nostril The neck had a full range of motion in all directions and no tenderness. 
The upper extremities showed a full range of motion and excellent strength bilaterally. Finger-to-
nose testing was normal and there was no tremor. 
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The thoracic spine had a normal configuration, as did the lumbar spine. Range of motion was 
normal. He could bend over to touch the floor without difficulty, and there was no tenderness over 
the spine. 
The lower extremity showed normal strength, with good walking on heels and toes. He could walk 
tandem with eyes open or closed and Romberg was negative. 
Reflexes were symmetrical and within normal limits. Babinski was negative. 
Sensory examination was normal throughout for tuning fork, position, sharp object, etc. 
X-rays have been reviewed and show a greater-than-average asymmetry of the lateral ventricle. 
The AMA Guide to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment Fourth Edition, as modified, was used 
as a reference. 
Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was involved in circumstances as outlined, the panel 
concludes in terms of reasonable medical probability as follows: 
1) There is not a medically demonstrable causal connection between the applicant's 1 June 
1993 and 8 July 1993 grand mal seizures and his work as an animal control officer in 
Davis County during 1991 through 1993. 
Comment: Our conclusion on this is based on an effort to balance various factors that may 
reasonably be considered as contributory to the occurrence of isolated grand mal seizures. 
On the one hand, we have the suggestion that one or more of the chemical substances he 
was exposed to triggered these seizures. It seems quite unlikely that the exposure to the 
Clorox solution reached sufficient levels to cause any impact on his cerebral function since 
there does not appear to have been any of the observed prodromes of significant respiratory 
distress which ordinarily accompanied even slight exposures to any Clorox type spray. 
There is secondly, a significant delay in the occurrence after the last exposure, during 
which he was apparently able to function well, suggesting there was no acute involvement. 
Likewise, it is not reasonable that without major noticeable respiratory distress, that there 
would be any continuing effects of the Clorox type exposure on an accumulative basis. 
The other two, the detergent and the Parvosol, are not of the nature which are likely to 
produce a convulsive seizure, especially where there was no indication of effect at the time 
of exposure. Possible exposure to other toxic agents has apparently been exhausted by 
those who have studied this, as well. 
On the other hand, we have a history of a number of other factors which must be 
considered. Hie decreased smell function is most commonly an effect of an injury which 
ruptures the olfactory fibers coming down through the lamina cribrosa beneath the frontal 
lobes. Although we do not know of a specific injury, this can occur without loss of 
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consciousness or otherwise affect the person in other than loss of olfactory function, 
especially early in life. Secondly, there is a history of an abnormal ventricle consistent 
with an injury back in 1988. There is a localized EEG abnormality recorded, which is not 
likely the result of a diffuse general toxic agent. 
There are additional historic events to consider, including the "concussion" in the boxing 
match when he was in college, sufficient to require emergency room care, and according 
to his mother, a period when he missed enough school to delay his education. Secondly 
is the event when he hit his head on the door frame of the vehicle, which was considered 
sufficient to secure a CT scan at the time. Lastly, there is the slightly low blood sugar not 
ed on arrival at the doctor's office, but this in itself would not have occurred from exposure 
to the chemicals under consideration. There is a long-standing evidence of asymmetry of 
the lateral ventricles. 
This, it appears to the panel in terms of reasonable medical probability these other multiple 
evidences of impact on the brain were more likely the causative factor than what would 
have to be an extremely atypical manner of chemical effect on the brain. 
The suggestion that his reported anosmia might have allowed him to have a greater 
exposure seems to be negated by his intolerance of even minimal exposures to gasoline 
fumes, paint fiimes, or die Clorox subsequently, with physical symptoms actually being 
suggested in relation to those exposures of a non-industrial sort as well. 
2) The applicant's seizure problem consists of two highly probable grand mal seizures. 
Comment: This conclusion is circumstantial, but the description of his status and the 
clearly bitten tongue makes the diagnosis quite probable. As for causation, see the 
comment above. 
3) We have not identified any seizure problems related to his work for Davis County during 
1991 through 1993. Further, we do not believe he had a nonwork-related disability which 
was affected by his Davis County work. 
4) The medical care the applicant received since 1 June 1993 was not necessitated by 
exposure to chemicals while working for Davis County during the relevant periods as 
indicated in the following comment: 
Comment: In the sense that there was from the first a strong supposition that his work 
activities had caused the seizures, initially by his family doctor and seconded by the 
consultant, it is reasonable to assume that that medical care was necessitated by what was 
assumed to be an exposure to the chemicals. Although laboratory tests did not confirm the 
presence of any organic chemicals and/or on further review as we have evaluated the case, 
it did not appear that the chemical exposure was the causative factor of the seizures, it is 
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still reasonable to conclude that the medical care was justified because of the circumstances 
in which the seizures occurred and the various evaluations were done-to reach a further 
definition of the nature of the problem, whether subsequently agreed to by other physicians 
or not As an example, in a case of a suspected broken limb, an X-ray being taken being 
negative for fracture does not mean that it was not a reasonable medical expense to 
determine that. 
5) Future medical care reasonably expected to be necessitated by his exposure is none. 
Comment: See the general comment under question one. 
6) The applicant does not appear to have any permanent impairment, except for the anosmia 
and the seizure disorder, both of which are considered non-industrial. 
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Members of the panel will be happy to try and respond to any additional qpgstions if it would be 
helpful. 
Respectfully submitted, 
it-
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Attachments: Toxicological summary note 
Ingredient lists for selected chemical agents 
CENTER FOR HUMAN TOXICOLOGY 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH • 417 WAKARA WAY RM 290 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84108 • (801) 581 -5117 FAX (801) 581-5034 
5-28-94 
Toxicology Summary Note and Ingredients List for Selected Chemical Agents. 
Parvosol: Quaternary ammonium compounds (detergents) 
Lemoset: Quaternary ammonium chloride compounds (detergents) 
Clorox: Sodium hypochlorite solution 
In my opinion, there is no scientific evidence that a workplace exposure, as described by 
Mr. Thompson, to the above compounds would result in a seizure disorder. Such 
chemicals are used commonly and unless the exposure is excessive (greater than routine 
workplace exposure) or the person intentially consumes the chemical there are no reports 
of seizure disorders. Further, if the clorox exposure were sufficient to produce systemic 
symptoms, it is likely that Mr. Thompson would have experienced respiratory difficulties 
as well as irritation to the mucous membranes of the mouth and upper airways. 
Thus, I fully agree with the contents of this report. 
Douglas E. Rollins, M.D., Ph.D. 
Director, Center for Human Toxicology 
Professor, Pharmacology and Toxicology 
University of Utah 
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INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EVALUATION 
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January 18, 1994 
Peggy Patterson 
Legal Adjuster 
Workman's Compensation Fund of Utah 
P.O. BOX 57929 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
RE: IVAN DEE THOMPSON 
UUNC: 792598-5 
Dear Ms. Patterson: 
I have evaluated Mr. Ivan Dee Thompson and have reviewed the 
medical record. Reports of radiological studies were available, 
but I have not been able to review the original films. It is my 
understanding that radiological studies were unrevealing concerning 
the current problem. According to the record, the patient had an 
incidental finding, which has been surgically corrected. 
Enclosed, please find a copy of my summary. It is my 
understanding that the question arose as to contribution of Clorox 
(sodium hypochlorite). It was felt that anosmia that the patient 
has had since childhood may have contributed to excessive exposure 
and his seizures may have been neurotoxic symptoms thereof. 
I reviewed what was available concerning this agent and it is 
my understanding that the agent is irritant and overexposure would 
probably be obvious because of local mucosal irritation and 
possibly upper respiratory symptoms. It does not appear that Mr. 
Thompson has suffered either acute or chronic symptoms suggestive 
of such toxic exposure. Therefore, I am not sure if we have strong 
reasons to consider neurotoxicity of sodium hypochlorite as 
explanation for seizures. At this time, it would appear prudent to 
manage his seizure disorder as a condition of unknown etiology and 
I would agree with Dr. Halquist's action to place him on anti-
epileptic drug prophylaxis. I am inclined to recommend a re-
evaluation in one year and consider having him come of Phenytoin if 
he remains without recurrent symptoms. 
I hope I have addressed the questions that have been raised, 
but would be happy to write a response to additional questions if 
there should be any. 
Sincerely Yours, 
Fumisuke Matsuo, M.D. 
c c : Roberta Halqu i s t , M . D ^ ^ ^ N e u r o l o g y FM/680.typ 
School of Medicine 
Medical Center 
50 North Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84132 
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CLINIC NOTE 
December 29, 1993 
RE: IVAN THOMPSON 
UUMC: 792598-5 
The patient is a 31-year-old and was accompanied by his wife. The 
patient works for the Davis County as an animal control officer and 
suffered from episodes that were clinically presumed to be 
generalized convulsive seizures. They occurred on June 1 and July 
8, 1993. He has been evaluated initially by Dennis Peterson, M.D. 
and subsequently Roberta Hallguist, M.D. The diagnosis of seizure 
disorder has been made and he has been treated with Dilantin. Its 
current dose is 600 mg a day for the past three months. Dr. 
Hallguist felt that his seizures were attributable to Clorox. 
Clorox is a cleaning agent that the patient has been exposed to 
relatively regularly at work. He is not the only staff who has had 
exposure to Clorox# but Dr. Hallquist felt that his exposure may 
well have been very significant because he has suffered anosmia 
since childhood# and his ability to protect him from intoxication 
is significantly impaired. He has worked in this capacity for the 
past two years without difficulty up to this time. Apparently, the 
onset of anosmia was gradual. Previously, investigations failed to 
reveal anything significant. There is no history suggestive of 
significant head injury. MRI of the head was reported as normal. 
On June 1, 1993, he was cleaning his truck in the mid-afternoon. 
It had been a usual day and he does not recall anything unusual 
about the day prior or the sleep the night before. He is amnestic, 
and there was no witness, but he showed up at home, driving his 
truck. His clothes were wet below the chest. His wife estimated 
that the period of amnesia was probably approximately 45 minutes of 
duration. Because of concern, his wife insisted that he would see 
Dr. Peterson. He collapsed at the clinic, but general physical 
findings were normal, including EKG. He was hospitalized 
subsequently for two days. EEG and MRI were normal. He was 
released home for further observation on medical leave. He recalls 
having a hard time walking, and was not able to eat well. He took 
two weeks off, then went to alternating 24 hours on and off to the 
answering service. When he finally returned to his regular duty, 
a similar incident occurred. He was cleaning the truck and 
subsequently went home for lunch. Probably, he ate lunch and 
apparently threw up. His supervisor called the paramedics because 
she was not able to get hold of him. He was hospitalized again and 
was seen by Dr. Hallquist. Dilantin was started then. 
(Continued) 
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He has been married for seven years, and has one two and one-half 
year old child. His health has been good otherwise. He snores 
when he is congested, but his sleep has been normal and he reports 
no parasomniac symptoms. He recalls a boxing accident in 1981, It 
may have resulted in concussion. He suffered dizziness and 
disorientation. He underwent CAT scan with normal result. 
During recent neurological investigations, abnormality of the bone 
assumed to be dysplasia of the roof of the orbit was diagnosed and 
he underwent a resection surgery on October 19. Indication for the 
surgery was the potential for compression of the optic nerve and 
ocular globe. His neurological findings were essentially normal, 
except for clinical anosmia bilaterally. There is no abnormality 
of visual function or auditory functions. EE6 was normal at this 
visit. The patient was requested to bri ng in MRI of the head for 
detailed review. 
Fumisuke Matsuo, M.D. 
F'M(/6S7.typ 
